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GOVERNMENT REGULATION: FROM
INDEPENDENCY TO DEPENDENCY, PART 2
STEVEN ALAN SAMSON*

ABSTRACT
What Robert Bellah calls ‘expressive individualism’ has led to
unprecedented social legislation in America and expanded
government employment since the 1960s, helping to produce a
generous supply of public services, policy entrepreneurs, and
clientele groups. The legal scholar Lawrence M Friedman notes
that ‘the right to be ‘oneself,’ to choose oneself, is placed in a
special and privileged position.’ As a consequence, ‘achievement is
defined in subjective, personal terms, rather than in objective,
social terms.’ When the claims of expressive individualism are
considered in tandem with the increasing reach of the modern
social service state, a case may be made for their mutual
dependency.
Today, the regulatory operations of central governments impinge
upon virtually all areas of life, leading to widespread efforts by
interest groups to have their vision of the good life implemented
through law and regulatory oversight. Much of the resulting fiscal,
educational, and social intervention is largely invisible to the
electorate but has led to greater dependency. It also led the
economist George J Stigler to offer a theory of regulatory capture
when he observed that clientele groups develop a mutually
beneficial relationship with the agencies that regulate their
activities. Indeed, when this becomes business as usual, few will call
it corruption. Thus, when examining laws and public policies, it is
always wise to ask: Cui bono? Who benefits? As the Watergate
whistle-blower, Mark Felt, put it: ‘follow the money.’
This article is drawn from a series of eight introductory lectures and
readings for a course on government regulation. Part II is a
revision of the last four lectures.

*
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THE REFORMIST IMPULSE AND PROGRESSIVISM

The first part was devoted to an examination of the proper sphere and
scope of the law in a free society, two very different conceptions of
liberty, the principles of limited government that the framers designed
into the Constitution, and the economic dynamism that has been one of
the fruits of western Christianity.
Let us now consider the factors that have led to a greater and greater state
of dependency. A speech attributed to Congressman David Crockett of
Tennessee, like the later writings of Frederic Bastiat on legal plunder and
Francis Lieber on Anglican liberty, bears witness to a constitutional
world that even in the late 1820s was beginning to pass away. 1 James
Kurth ascribes this breakdown of traditional political forms to a
misapplication of the original rejection by the Protestant Reformation of
what reformers believed to be the misuse of hierarchy and community in
matters relating to salvation. What Kurth calls the Protestant Deformation
is a more general stripping of hierarchy and community, traditions and
customs, from every area of life.2 His thesis complements Ralph Raico’s
attribution of ‘The European Miracle’ to the influence of Christianity, as
discussed in the previous section, while also accounting for its decline.3
1

Foundation for Economic Education, ‘Not Yours to Give’
<http://www.fee.org/library/detail/not-your-to-give-2>. This speech, sometimes
entitled ‘Not Yours to Give,’ which was published only decades following Crockett’s
death, is most likely a conflation of fact and folklore: American Memory, ‘A Century
of Lawmaking for a New Nation: US Congressional Documents and Debates, 17741875’<http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llrd&fileName=006/llrd006.db&recNum=308>.
2
Kurth identifies six stages in this process of declension, culminating in a
highly individualistic idea of universal human rights defined to the exclusion of
hierarchy and community, tradition and custom: James Kurth, ‘The Protestant
Deformation’ (December 2005) The American Interest <http://www.the-americaninterest.com/articles/2005/12/1/the-protestant-deformation/>.
3
See Liberty University, ‘Selected Works of Steven Alan Samson’
<http://works.bepress.com/steven_samson/133/>.
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Indeed, these and innumerable other works provide a historical context
for understanding both the Christian contribution to the rise of the West
as well as its transition away from its specifically Christian character.4 In
light of this history, Stephen Moore raised an interesting question in a
Wall Street Journal editorial some time ago: how is it that America,
‘sweet land of liberty,’ has become a nation of takers rather than
makers?5
Such problems are not unique to our day and age. Joshua 9 describes
Jotham’s resistance to Abimelech’s tyranny and is noteworthy for its
story of the trees and the bramble. Psalm 73 warns of the slippery places
where the wicked are brought to destruction. In ‘Heart of Darkness,’
Joseph Conrad characterized civilization as a thin veneer. It is a resource
that must be renewed every generation. How each generation is educated
may be a truly a matter of national security, but does that make it the
unique and specific responsibility of the state? The paradox is that the
state must depend upon virtues that it is not well-equipped to instill. As
the Christian political philosopher J Budziszewski puts it: ‘through
subsidiarity, the government honors virtue and protects its teachers, but

4

Especially recommended are M Stanton Evans, The Theme Is Freedom
(Regnery Publishing, 1996) which is also cited in David Gress, From Plato to NATO:
The Idea of the West and Its Opponents (Free Press, 2004). Recent scholars who have
reflected on the diverse elements that brought western civilization into being include
Remi Brague, Pierre Manent, Philippe Nemo, Christopher Dawson, Roger Scruton,
and Rodney Stark.
5
Stephen Moore, ‘We’ve Become a Nation of Takers, Not Makers’ (April
2011) The Wall Street Journal
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870405020457621907386718
2108?mg=reno64wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405274870405
0204576219073867182108.html>; See also Nicholas Eberstadt, A Nation of Takers:
America’s Entitlement Epidemic (Templeton Press, 2012) 23: ‘[B]oth political parties
have, on the whole, been working together in an often unspoken consensus to fuel the
explosion of entitlement spending in modern America.’
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without trying to take their place.’6 A healthy civil society that nurtures a
variety of institutions, including the voluntary associations noted by
Alexis de Tocqueville, does not require a vast regulatory apparatus to
take care of every need.
Let us now examine some of the ways and the reasons why the heritage
of our civilization has been placed at risk. In the fourth section we
focused on the religious underpinnings of the West’s dynamic economic
growth. In this section we will consider the religious and intellectual
sources of a shift toward greater intervention and regulation by the state.
Although these trends long predated the Progressive movement of the
early twentieth century, it was during the Progressive period of a century
ago that many of them reached their first great flowering.
Marc Allen Eisner has identified four major attributes of Progressivism: a
heavy emphasis on scientific expertise, an immersion into evolutionary
theory, a celebration of democracy, and a rejection of constitutional
formalism.7 Let us begin by considering each factor.
First, the post-Civil War period saw, beginning in 1876 with the founding
of Johns Hopkins University, the advent of the German-style scientific
research university, culminating in the Ph.D. In fact, Francis Lieber, who
spent a year in England, was one the earliest German-educated scholars
to emigrate to the United States, which he did in 1827. Before the end of
the nineteenth century, higher education was in the grips of an intellectual
revolution that transformed public education and led to the creation of
science-based professions and professional associations in such field as

6

J Budziszewski, The Revenge of Conscience: Politics and the Fall of Man
(Spence Publishing Company, 1999) 70.
7
Marc Allen Eisner, The American Political Economy: Institutional Evolution
of Market and State (Routledge, 2011) 42-4.
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law, medicine, education, and theology. During the same period, the
United States became the largest investment market in the world as it
entered the Second Industrial Revolution with the subsidization of
transcontinental railroads, the electrification of cities in the 1880s, the
development of new steel-making processes, innovations in precision
instruments, a growing emphasis on heavy industry, and the advent of the
telephone, the automobile, and the airplane – all in less than four decades.
All of this was accompanied, second, by the intellectual revolution
inspired by the theory of evolution. Francis Lieber may have remained
unconvinced by Darwin’s thesis, but the social sciences began taking on
evolutionary coloring in the 1850s and a new generation of scholars took
to it swimmingly. By the late nineteenth century, a paradigm shift had
occurred throughout academic circles. The Idealist philosophy of Hegel
and other German philosophers had already made the earlier New
England Transcendentalists receptive to progressive ideas. Following the
Civil War, constitutional interpretation began to be transformed. Ronald
Pestritto contends that Woodrow Wilson, contrary to James Madison,
believed that ‘the latent causes of faction are not sown in the nature of
man, or if they are, historical progress will overcome this human nature.’8
Third, the Progressive reform movement pioneered many specific
Progressive and democratic practices. The so-called Wisconsin Idea
placed the university at the center of advice about public policy. Through
the efforts of Govenor Robert M LaFollette, Sr., one of the ‘heroes of
insurgency,’9 Wisconsin came to be seen as a ‘laboratory for democracy.’
This early progressive program as a whole was influenced by a growing

8

Ronald J Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Progressivism
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) 6-7.
9
Thomas Dreier, Heroes of Insurgency (Human Life Pub Co, 1910).
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German immigrant population inspired by social welfare system
established under Otto von Bismarck. Among the innovations associated
with Wisconsin were a progressive state income tax, primary elections,
workers’ compensation, regulation of utilities, university extension
services, and the direct election of senators. In Oregon, William S
U’Ren’s Direct Legislation League promoted the Oregon System, which
included the initiative, referendum, direct primary, and recall.
Throughout the country, Progressives promoted new forms of city
government, such as the commission system and use of city managers,
and pushed for the income tax and direct election amendments, along
with anti-trust legislation, new regulatory laws, and the Federal Reserve
System. At the end of the First World War Progressives were also
instrumental in the ratification of the prohibition and women’s suffrage
amendments.
Finally, the most revolutionary aspect of the Progressive movement was
its reinterpretation of everything according to a process philosophy that
arose out of the historicism of Hegel and the evolutionary biology of
Darwin. A leading academic Progressive, Woodrow Wilson, who earned
his Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins, served for many years as the president of
Princeton. In quick succession, he was elected governor of New Jersey
(1910) and president of the United States (1912) before publishing a
book, The New Freedom (1913), that expressed the Progressive credo:
All that progressives ask or desire is permission – in an era when
‘development,’ ‘evolution,’ is the scientific word – to interpret the
Constitution according to the Darwinian principle; all they ask is
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recognition of the fact that a nation is a living thing and not a
machine.10

Thus was born the notion of a ‘living Constitution’ that responds to
fluidly to changing circumstances. Gone was the language of binding the
government with the chains of the Constitution. Thus was a so-called
relic of horse and buggy days relegated to the intellectual and institutional
scrap heap.
Support for Progressivism crossed party lines. So it should not be
surprising that a broad-based middle class movement which inspired the
allegiance of three very different presidents – Theodore Roosevelt,
William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson – was guided more by the
pragmatism of William James and John Dewey than by a coherent
ideology. The New Nationalism promoted by Herbert Croly and
Theodore Roosevelt was designed to convert the national government
into a countervailing force that could regulate business practices on
behalf of the public interest. 11 In other words, Big Government was
necessary to control Big Business. In the end, Progressives were more
successful at converting the central government into a major power
broker than in breaking up the centers of financial and industrial power.
A powerful government bureaucracy grew but not as an independent
force. Instead, a pragmatic partnership tied business and government
together.
What shall we make of such a transformation in which the twin forces of
evolution and revolution leapfrog into an endlessly progressive future? In

10

Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom (Doubleday, Page, and Co, 1921) 48.
See Sidney M Milkis, ‘Why the Election of 1912 Changed America’ (15
February
2003)
Claremont
Review
of
Books
<http://claremont.org/index.php?act=crbArticle&id=1247>.
11
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The Republic of Choice, the legal scholar Lawrence M Friedman
maintains that:
the right to be ‘oneself,’ to choose oneself, is placed in a special and
privileged position; in which expression is favored over self-control;
in which achievement is defined in subjective, personal terms, rather
than in objective, social terms.12

Where once society favored the inner-directed personality type associated
with the Protestant Ethic, now it ironically favors the other-directed
personality described by David Riesman and his co-authors of The Lonely
Crowd.
What Robert Bellah termed ‘expressive individualism’ in Habits of the
Heart has led to unprecedented social legislation since the 1960s and
expanded government employment while helping produce a generous
supply of public services, policy entrepreneurs, and clientele groups
presided over by national political and administrative agencies. 13 As the
political scientist James Kurth notes:
The ideology of expressive individualism thus reaches into all
aspects of society; it is a total philosophy. The result appears to be
totally opposite from the totalitarianism of the state, but it is a sort
of totalitarianism of the self. Both totalitarianisms are relentless in
breaking down intermediate bodies and mediating institutions that
stand between the individual and the highest powers or the widest
forces. With the totalitarianism of the state, the highest powers are

12

Lawrence W Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority, and Culture
(Harvard University Press, 1990) 3.
13
Robert Bellah et al, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in
American Life (University of California Press, 1985).
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the authorities of the nation state; with the totalitarianism of the self,
the widest forces are the agencies of the global economy.14

The imperial self, like the imperial state, opportunistically seizes
whatever advantages it can. The economist George J. Stigler helped
develop the theory of regulatory capture, one of the mainsprings of public
choice theory, in which clientele groups develop a mutually beneficial
relationship with the agencies that regulate their activities. Writing
somewhat tongue-in-check, Stigler observed:
The first purpose of the empirical studies is to identify the purpose
of the legislation! The announced goals of a policy are sometimes
unrelated or perversely related to its actual effects, and the truly
intended effects should be deduced from the actual effects.15

Let that barbed hook work its way down for a moment. Cui bono? Who
benefits? Follow the money. Stigler is saying in effect that if you want to
know the real purpose of a law, look at its actual effects, not the reasons
given for public consumption. Q.E.D.: That is as close to an empirical
demonstration of legislative intent as you are likely to get. Bastiat’s
analytical model of legal plunder is here once again substantiated.16
What is common to both totalitarian tendencies is the subordination of the
citizenry and rivals to some sort of Rousseauan sovereign ‘general will’ –
14

Kurth, above n 2.
George J Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation
(University of Chicago Press, 1975) 140. Stigler’s comment anticipates the remark by
then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi before passage of the Affordable Care Act in
2010 that ‘we have to pass the bill so that you can find out what's in it.’
16
Peter Schweizer uses the term ‘legalized extortion’ and examines the ‘shakedown’ not only of individual businesses but also of entire industries in Extortion:
How Politicians Extract Your Money, Buy Votes, and Line Their Own Pockets
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013); Hughes refers both to rent-seeking and
protectionism: Jonathan R T Hughes, The Government Habit Redux: Economic
Controls from Colonial Times to the Present (Princeton University Press, 1991) 11,
16, 220; for features of cronyism around the United States see Chrony Chronicles,
‘What is Cronyism’ <http://cronychronicles.org/>.
15
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something reminiscent of the old Leninist conceit of ‘democratic
centralism.’ By contrast, an earlier scholar, Francis Lieber, coined the
term ‘institutional liberty’ to refer to a healthy interaction among various
self-governing social, occupational, and religious institutions that
historically undergirded political pluralism. The devolution and
distribution of power has traditionally been upheld and protected by such
constitutional ideas and forms as ‘federalism’ (Heinrich Bullinger and
James Madison), ‘symbiotics’ (Johannes Althusius), ‘sphere sovereignty’
(Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd), and ‘subsidiarity’ (Leo
XIII and Hilaire Belloc).
Kurth contends that both these tendencies – state-sovereignty and selfsovereignty17 – take us far afield from the sovereignty of God, which was
the banner under which the Protestant reformers launched what Eugen
Rosenstock-Huessy and his student Harold Berman called one of a series
of secular revolutions. From the viewpoint of a thousand years of history,
Rosenstock’s insight is that our major institutions arose Out of
Revolution, to borrow the title of his 1938 treatise, which is subtitled
Autobiography of Western Man. ‘The Truce of God, the free choice of a
profession, the liberty to make a will, the copyright of ideas—these
institutions are like letters in the alphabet which we call Western
civilization.’18
Guilds, universities, endowments and trusts, police forces: these are
among the fruits of a dynamic Christian civilization that spawned great
reform movements as well as revolutions. Rosenstock-Huessy, a historian

17

See also Jeane Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (Basic
Books, 2008).
18
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Out of Revolution: Autobiography of Western
Man (William Morrow, 1938) 30.
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and professor of law who left Germany about the time Hitler took power,
wrote five years later:
Our contemporaries are asking for institutions to protect the child,
the labourer, the mill hand, against exploitation. The character of the
legislation and of the institutions are now under discussion, and as
always the problem is how to go forward and take the next step
without losing the gains secured by previous institutions.19

This is always the danger given the utopian and revolutionary tendency of
what Lieber called Gallican liberty—as expressed through the French and
Russian revolutions—to throw the Anglican/Protestant baby out with the
bathwater.
Analyzing the culmination of the last half millennium of social change,
James Kurth notes:
Expressive individualism -- with its contempt for and protest against
all hierarchies, communities, traditions, and customs -- represents
the logical conclusion and the ultimate extreme of the secularization
of the Protestant religion. The Holy Trinity of original
Protestantism, the Supreme Being of Unitarianism, the American
nation of the American Creed have all been dethroned and replaced
by the imperial self. The long declension of the Protestant
Reformation has reached its end point in the Protestant
Deformation. The Protestant Deformation is a Protestantism without
God, a reformation against all forms.20

Here again we see the intellectual provenance of the Progressives’ attack
on constitutional formalism in the name of a living and breathing

19

Ibid 31.
Kurth, above n 2; both Harold Berman, Lawrence Friedman, and Herbert W
Titus are among the legal scholars who have discussed the impact of this ‘revolt
against formalism.’
20

90

Samson, Government Regulation, Part II

2014

Constitution. While serving as governor of New York, Charles Evans
Hughes remarked, long before he became Chief Justice: ‘the Constitution
is what the judges say it is.’ A later Chief Justice, Fred Vinson, added:
Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that
there are no absolutes…. To those who would paralyze our
Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a
semantic straitjacket we must reply that all concepts are relative.21

It appears that logic was not their strong suit. A disregard for
constitutional standards has subsequently spread through the system.

II

THE RISE OF THE REGULATORY STATE

Three quarters of a century ago, Garet Garrett opened his meditation on
the New Deal political revolution with this striking sentence: ‘A time
came when the only people who had ever been free began to ask: What is
freedom?’ With the language of a bedtime story—‘Once upon a time’—
Garrett ushers us into a mythological dimension that should give us
pause. In the Foreword to The People’s Pottage, Garrett posed some
leading questions:
Why should people not be free to say they would have less freedom
in order to have more of some other good? What other good?
Security. What else? Stability. And beyond that? Beyond that the
sympathies of we, and all men as brothers, instead of the willful I, as
if each man were a sovereign, self-regarding individual.22

Note the way he describes the framing of the issue: How freedom has
been redefined as selfishness. Garrett, who was for many years the editor
of the Saturday Evening Post, understood that a successful revolution in
21

Dennis v United States, 341 US 494, 508 (1951).
Garet Garrett, The People’s Pottage (Caxton
<http://mises.org/books/pottage.pdf>.
22

Printers,

1953)

5

Vol 5

The Western Australian Jurist

91

the name of reform had occurred. As early as 1938 when he wrote a
booklet entitled ‘The Revolution Was,’ he could describe the revolution
in a single sentence: ‘Executive power over the social and economic life
of the nation was increased.’23
Decades after Garrett wrote, the legal historian Harold J. Berman
described a spirit of lawlessness that had spread through the land:
The law is becoming more fragmented, more subjective, geared
more to expediency and less to morality, concerned more with
immediate consequences and less with consistency or continuity.
Thus the historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being
washed away in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is
threatened with collapse. … Almost all the nations of the West are
threatened today by a cynicism about law, leading to a contempt for
law, on the part of all classes of the population.24

Perhaps this breakdown of discipline is connected with the increase of
executive power in the same way as a vacuum is to whatever fills it.
We should note that the problem Garrett and Berman have described is
not simply a matter of public administration but also displays a loss of
loyalty to longstanding legal and political traditions. James Madison
made a profound observation in Federalist 57:
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that
they can make no law which will not have its full operation on
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the
society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by
which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together.
23

Ibid 16.
Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal
Tradition (Harvard University, 1983) 39.
24
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It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy
of sentiments, of which few governments have furnished examples;
but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.
If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives from
making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a particular
class of the society? I answer: the genius of the whole system; the
nature of just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and
manly spirit which actuates the people of America—a spirit which
nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it. If this spirit
shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the
legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to
tolerate any thing but liberty.25

In that last phrase, Madison seems to anticipate the rise of a political
messianism26 that pursues high-minded goals through high-handed means
by corrupting the tradition of limited government and thus contributing to
the failure of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to honor
constitutional limitations. ‘[W]hat is to prevent discretionary justice,’
Berman later asked, ‘from being an instrument of repression and even a
pretext for barbarism and brutality, as it became in Nazi Germany?’27 He
added:
Cynicism about the law, and lawlessness, will not be overcome by adhering to
a so-called realism which denies the autonomy, the integrity, and the
ongoingness of our legal tradition. In the words of Edmund Burke, those who

25

James Madison, ‘The Federalist No 57: The Alleged Tendency of the New
Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation (2013) Constitution Society
<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa57.htm>.
26
J L Talmon, Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase (Secker & Warburg,
1960); see also Rosenstock-Huessy, above n 18, 217.
27
Berman, above n 24, 40-1.
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do not look backward to their ancestry will not look forward to their
posterity.

28

The Bible, which is at the base of this tradition,29 provides for the rule of
law, which, after all, is designed to regulate behavior. The Ten
Commandments summarize the law and the Great Commandment
summarizes the essence of the law. But punctilious attention to the
external signs of the law can cause it to become hidebound and, well,
legalistic. Jesus answered one group of hair-splitting theologians that
sought to test him by replying that they neither knew the Scriptures nor
the power of God (Matt. 22:29). Today’s revolt against legal formalism
has promoted a similar disrespect for law.
The historical influence of the preaching of the Gospel shows both the
Scriptures and the power of God at work in the development of Western
civilization. The English legal tradition makes a distinction between law
and equity that carries over into the United States Constitution. With the
rise of commerce during the Middle Ages,
rules governing business activities multiplied. The separate justice [for
commerce] developed into equity proceedings in the courts of Chancery, the
laws of bailment grew, and if the sea was involved, the courts of Admiralty
applied laws derived from the Hanseatic League, which in turn were based
upon the ancient rules of the sea, the laws of Oleron [Eleanor of Aquitaine]
and Wisby. Business developed within a corset of law that defined acceptable
rules of behavior.

30

The creative interplay between law and equity provided a spawning
ground for the development of Anglican liberty and, later, American
28

Ibid 41.
See John C H Wu, Fountain of Justice: A Study in the Natural Law (Sheed
and Ward, 1955).
30
Hughes, above n 16, 38.
29
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liberty. During the Protestant Reformation, a new mass medium—the
printing press—contributed to the intellectual ferment that resulted from
the circulation of new translations of the Bible into the vernacular
languages. In The Book That Made Your World, the Indian philosopher
Vishal Mangalwadi describes the intellectual atmosphere of sixteenth
century England:
Alehouses became debating societies as people interpreted and applied the
Bible differently to the intellectual and social issues of the day. Some were
content to let the church settle their disputes. Others realized that the only way
to determine which interpretation was correct was to read the Bible with valid
rules of interpretation. This was a bottom-up revolution. It infused the minds
of all literate Englishmen—not just those in universities—with a new logical
bent. It took no time for that movement to spread into other aspects of
people’s lives. . . . [O]nce the English people began using logic to interpret the
Bible, they acquired a skill that propelled their nation to the forefront of world
politics, economics, and thought.

31

It should be noted that self-governing Americans, who were the heirs of
that period of Protestant ferment, later showed themselves to be capable
of systematizing laws both formally through the codification movement
led by David Dudley Field in New York and informally through the
development of mining laws during the California gold rush to which his
brother, the future Justice Stephen Field, devoted some of his early
efforts. Insights into this period may be gleaned from Hernando de Soto’s
The Mystery of Capital and the work of another legal historian, J Willard
Hurst, who attributed nineteenth century industrialization in part to a

31

Vishal Mangalwadi, The Book That Made Your World: How the Bible
Created the Soul of Western Civilization (Thomas Nelson, 2011) 87-8.
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‘release of energy’ that resulted from a preference shown ‘for dynamic
over static property.’32
Given this intellectual vitality, it should be evident, however, that
protecting the integrity of the state, the law, the economy, and all other
institutions is an even greater challenge when literacy becomes almost
universal. As Mangalwadi observed:
Influenced by William Tyndale’s book The Obedience of a Christian Man
(1528), Henry [VIII] thought that reading the Bible would make Englishmen
docile and obedient. He was furious when just the opposite happened.

33

Centuries later, Madison thought it necessary to use ‘ambition to
counteract ambition’ because of the release of so much pent-up
intellectual and entrepreneurial energy within the dynamic American
society.34 The energy released by the Glorious Revolution and subsequent
Industrial Revolution was partially rooted in an English Reformation
modeled, as noted by Eric Nelson, on The Hebrew Republic.35
Alongside this intellectual ferment, there is another factor to consider.
The English system of land tenure helps explain the rise of the regulatory
state, which the economic historian Jonathan R. T. Hughes traces back to
the colonial period:

32

James Williard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the NineteenthCentury United States (University of Wisconsin Press, 1956) 28.
33
Mangalwadi, above n 31, 87.
34
A
James Madison, ‘The Federalist No 51: The Structure of the
Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different
Departments’ (2013)
<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm>.
35
See Eric Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the
Transformation of European Political Thought (Harvard University Press, 2010); see
also Gai Ferdon, ‘The Political Use of the Bible in Early Modern Britain’ (2013) The
Jubilee
Centre
<http://www.jubilee-centre.org/political-use-bible-early-modernbritain-dr-gai-ferdon/>.
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The essence of American capitalism was transplanted from England in the
mainland American colonies. . . . For in the ancient English land tenure of free
and common socage lay the seed of American capitalism as it would be in
future, a powerful right of private ownership of land and natural resources,
which in time was generalized to other forms of private property. In socage
tenure the owner had the full rights to exploit, as he pleased, both surface and
subsurface resources. Rapid alienation meant selling, buying, and settling land
as fast as men and women were willing to take up new territories. . . . Fee
socage ensured that land, once it was open to private purchase, would be
settled at maximum speed. It also meant that, if society at large was to be
protected from the adverse spillover effects of private economic activity,
government power would ultimately have to be imposed and private right
controlled.

36

But there was also an important stipulation in this arrangement: Taxes
had to be paid or else the land reverted to the donor, which during the
colonial period meant the Crown and which today is the people of the
United States. This arrangement virtually guaranteed that land would not
be left idle as it is in some parts of the world.
The regulatory state that has grown up for more than a century meets
some very real needs but has also encouraged long-standing expectations
within society. Although American economists typically criticize
government regulations as something incompatible with a free market,
Hughes argues they are retained because the public considers them
desirable. But, at the same time, Hughes illustrates and underscores
Bastiat’s main point:
The country’s form of government not only lends itself to favoritist legislation, but
depends upon it. A history of American government limited to those laws that sprang

36
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pure from the brains of the nation’s politicians with no special interests as their
objects would be a very short history indeed.

37

The historical precedent for such intervention is the use of the police
powers that date back to the Middle Ages to protect public health, safety,
peace, and morals:
Controls over business activity at the state and municipal levels were primarily
by license to limit entry, to raise tax revenues, to control morals, and to
regulate the quality and prices of franchised public-service enterprises.

38

Another scholar, Robert Kagan, has noted:
Many regulatory programs have been extremely effective, even if relatively
little is spent on enforcement. Regulations to prevent anthrax in cattle herds
virtually eradicated that deadly disease. … Safety regulations have sharply
reduced deaths in coal mines.

39

On the other hand, Kagan believes that some regulatory skepticism is
justified: ‘banking regulations did not prevent disastrously large numbers
of overly risky loans by American savings and loan organizations in the
1980s or by their Japanese equivalents half a decade later.’40 The question
can even be raised whether a particular regulatory regime creates certain
expectations that permit or even encourage risky business. Kagan
continues: ‘An example of widespread noncompliance or wholly
inadequate enforcement can be found to match almost every regulatory
success story.’41
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The problem may have less to do with the jurisdiction that creates the
regulations than with the larger purposes pursued by those with vested
interests and the compatibility of these interests with traditional
expectations. As Hughes notes:
What was controlled traditionally were four crucial points in the
flow of economic transactions: (1) number of participants in a given
activity, (2) conditions of participation, (3) prices charged by
participants either for products or services, and (4) quality of the
products or services. . . . This social control matrix is the subtle and
complex economy of controls we have experienced historically, and
with a few exceptions (for example, output control over crude-oil
extraction, or production by permit only, as in the case of peanut
farming) still do.42

What does such intervention signify? It is protectionism of one sort or
another: first, last, and always. As the economic historian Douglass North
has commented: ‘A continuing dilemma of regulatory agencies is that
they can become vehicles whereby the regulated regulate the regulators,
in the interest of the regulated—rather than that of the public.’43
What has changed since the Progressive era is the growth of the
administrative apparatus itself and its increasing use as an instrument of
political favors and favoritism.44 Perhaps the single most important and
lasting innovation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal era was the
42
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Executive Reorganization Act of 1939, which, as Sidney Milkis has
noted,
enhanced the [president’s control of the expanding activities of the
executive branch. As such, this legislation represents the genesis of
the institutional presidency, which was equipped to govern
independently of the constraints imposed by the regular political
process. ... Patronage appointments had traditionally been used to
nourish the party system; the New Deal celebrated an administrative
politics that fed instead an executive department oriented to
expanding liberal programs. As the administrative historian Paul
Van Riper has noted, the new practices created a new kind of
patronage, ‘a sort of intellectual and ideological patronage than the
more traditional partisan type.’45

As a result of this so-called Third New Deal, the Democratic party was
transformed into an incumbency party—’a way station on the road to
administrative government’—for the generations that followed and thus
became the means of ‘embedding progressive principles (considered
tantamount to political rights) in a bureaucratic structure that would
insulate reform and reformers from electoral change.’46
The myth of Progressivism held that ‘good government’ (once mocked as
‘goo-goo’) would guide society along the paths of progress. The reality,
however, returns us to Bastiat’s problem of false philanthropy, which
may be seen in conjunction with Hughes’s governmental habit. Bastiat
detected a contradiction at the heart the socialism of his day:
Here I encounter the most popular fallacy of our times. It is not
considered sufficient that the law should be just; it must be
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philanthropic. Nor is it sufficient that the law should guarantee to
every citizen the free and inoffensive use of his faculties for
physical, intellectual, and moral self-improvement. Instead, it is
demanded that the law should directly extend welfare, education,
and morality throughout the nation.47

As Sheldon Richman has noted:
If philanthropy is not voluntary, it destroys liberty and justice. The
law can give nothing that has not first been taken from its owner. He
applies that analysis to all forms of government intervention, from
tariffs to so-called public education.48

In Bastiat’s own words:
As long as it is admitted that the law may be diverted from its true
purpose—that it may violate property instead of protecting it—then
everyone will want to participate in making the law, either to protect
himself against plunder or to use it for plunder. Political questions
will always be prejudicial, dominant, and all-absorbing. There will
be fighting at the door of the Legislative Palace, and the struggle
within will be no less furious. To know this, it is hardly necessary to
examine what transpires in the French and English legislatures;
merely to understand the issue is to know the answer.49

But Bastiat was also careful to use such terms as ‘legal plunder’ and
‘false philanthropy’ analytically rather than moralistically:
I declare that I do not mean to attack the intentions or the morality
of anyone. Rather, I am attacking an idea which I believe to be
false; a system which appears to me to be unjust; an injustice so
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independent of personal intentions that each of us profits from it
without wishing to do so, and suffers from it without knowing the
cause of the suffering.50

Thus Bastiat’s argument is offered at the level of a public philosophy and
draws upon a long tradition of Christian realism. Consider a passage (no.
358) from Thoughts by the seventeenth century mathematician and
Christian apologist Blaise Pascal: ‘Man is neither angel nor brute, and the
unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute.’ 51
Now consider the full force of Pascal’s observations in light Bastiat’s
observation: ‘We must remember that law is force, and that,
consequently, the proper functions of the law cannot lawfully extend
beyond the proper functions of force.’52
We need to be reminded that force potentially brutalizes whatever it
touches. This is nowhere more passionately or memorably argued than in
Simone Weil’s The Iliad, or the Poem of Force (1940). 53 Political
compulsion is a blunt instrument to which people must have the freedom
to adjust their expectations and actions if they are to avoid being broken
upon it. As a means of delivering an ameliorative social reform agenda,
political compulsion at best offers only a more diffuse and anonymous
outlet for philanthropic impulses rather than a surgical tool for correcting
society’s defects. In the absence of a political consensus about means and
ends, it can only sow endless discord.
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The regulatory state inaugurated by the Roosevelt’s Third New Deal may
be sharply contrasted with the decentralized federal republic and the
public philosophy with which the American experiment began. Before
the Great Depression, Calvin Coolidge restated an earlier vision of
America that had been memorialized at Independence Day celebrations
for 150 years. In ‘The Inspiration of the Declaration,’ Coolidge noted
what shaped the thinking of the ordinary people who agreed together to
separate from imperial Britain. ‘They were a people who came under the
influence of a great spiritual development and acquired a great moral
power.’ More specifically, the President stated: ‘No one can examine this
record and escape the conclusion that in the great outline of its principles
the Declaration was the result of the religious teachings of the preceding
period.’ Coolidge concluded with the following observation:
No other theory is adequate to explain or comprehend the
Declaration of Independence. It is the product of the spiritual insight
of the people. We live in an age of science and of abounding
accumulation of material things. These did not create our
Declaration. Our Declaration created them. The things of the spirit
come first. Unless we cling to that, all our material prosperity,
overwhelming though it may appear, will turn to a barren scepter in
our grasp. If we are to maintain the great heritage which has been
bequeathed to us, we must be like minded as the fathers who created
it. We must not sink into a pagan materialism. We must cultivate the
reverence which they had for the things that are holy. We must
follow the spiritual and moral leadership which they showed. We
must keep replenished, that they may glow with a more compelling
flame, the altar fires before which they worshipped.54
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION

Let us for a moment think back to the first section at the beginning of this
essay when we briefly noted Henry Hazlitt’s Economics in One Lesson.
The lesson was simply this:
The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the
immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in
tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but
for all groups.55

Hazlitt asked, for example: does deficit spending stimulate the economy?
During the New Deal era, deficit spending by the government was
likened to ‘priming the pump’ with water to get it moving again. The
assumption was that we could spend our way right back to prosperity if
the government were to take the lead and assume much of the risk and
expense by taxing and borrowing. Is this so different from the idea that
Bastiat noticed nearly a century earlier when he observed how some
people assumed that damage caused by a storm could benefit a
community?
In order to understand where such an idea leads, Bastiat suggested that
we look at the matter on a small scale. When a homeowner or storekeeper
has a broken window replaced, the purchase of a new window may
appear to be a boon to the local economy. In his essay ‘That Which Is
Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen,’ Bastiat noted that what we see is the
benefit to the glass manufacturer and the window installer. What we miss
seeing is what economists call the opportunity cost—the other
transactions that might otherwise have been made. The loss of a window
may mean that the homeowner or storekeeper must forego some other
55
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purchase that might have benefited the clothier or a furniture maker
instead.56
Let us now remove the lenses that narrow our field of vision and, once
again, enlarge the scope of our thinking. The fourth section cited Francis
Lieber’s analysis of an early experiment with totalitarianism in France:
‘The advance of knowledge and intelligence,’ he wrote, ‘gives to
despotism a brilliancy, and the necessity of peace for exchange and
industry give it a facility to establish itself which it never possessed
before.’ 57 What needs to be asked here is: How did the advance of
knowledge that preceded the despotism happen in the first place?
‘Why Europe?’ asks James Nickel in Mathematics: Is God Silent? He
answers by quoting the physicist and philosopher of science, Stanley Jaki:
the history of science with its several stillbirths and only one viable
birth, clearly shows that the only cosmology, or view of the cosmos
as a whole, that was capable of generating science was a view of
which the principal disseminator was the Gospel itself.58

David Landes asks the same question in The Wealth and Poverty of
Nations: ‘Why Europe? Why Then?’ Landes focused on two factors:
buildup,

the

accumulation

of

knowledge

and

knowhow;

and

breakthrough—reaching and passing thresholds.’ He then emphasizes
three considerations:
1) the growing autonomy of intellectual inquiry;
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2) the development of unity in disunity in the form of a common,
implicitly adversarial method, that is, the creation of a language of
proof recognized, used, and understood across national and cultural
boundaries; and
3) the invention of invention, that is, the routinization of research and its
diffusion.

59

These considerations are the fruits of the Christian cosmology cited by
Father Jaki. They help account for the accumulated mass of intellectual
and material capital that produced what Ralph Raico called ‘The
European Miracle.’ The question to ask today is how we are squandering
that capital. Long before James Kurth answered by describing the stages
of a Protestant Deformation, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn did much the
same in a short story. Like one of the characters in the story, the
Kuehnelt-Leddihn suggests that a nominally Christian civilization is
heedlessly ‘living from the whiff of an empty bottle.’ 60 Have we been
casting our seed on rocky ground? Are we eating our seed corn rather
than planting it? Or, as the theologian Cornelius Van Til put it, living on
‘borrowed capital’ without replenishing it? Do we thoughtlessly risk
draining the wellsprings of our civilization’s creativity?
Questions such as these make the study of economics, politics, ethics,
law, and history so vital for getting our bearings. Let us turn to field of
political economy for a few concepts that may help clarify the impact of
what James Burnham called the ‘managerial revolution’ which has
restructured our customary habits as well as our expectations. It may help
59
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lead, first of all, to an understanding of how government regulation
operates; secondly, an appreciation of the values, priorities, and stakes
that are involved; and finally, insight into the ways the political agendas,
ideologies, and special pleading of various interest groups shape public
policy.
Like Sidney Milkis, Jonathan R. T. Hughes reached back to the Third
New Deal that resulted from restructuring the administrative apparatus in
1939.
In Executive Order 8248 Roosevelt set this country on a completely
uncharted course. Other presidents were happy enough to follow his
charismatic lead, and from 1939 to the present, great and infamous
events alike have stemmed from this power, including fundamental
contributions to our burgeoning apparatus of nonmarket control
over economic life.61

A concept that is especially relevant here is rent-seeking, which is
discussed by Michael Munger: ‘In politics you try to move money around
and take credit for it. In markets you try to create value and make profits.’
62

Adam Smith identified three forms or sources of income: profits,

wages, and rents. What is called rent-seeking involves the extraction of
something of value from others without compensation and without
enhancing productivity. Rent-seeking often involves the acquisition of
special monopoly privileges through legislation or regulation by a
government agency. A privilege, the Roman term for a private law, is a
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kind of property that exists at the pleasure of the state. Such a monopoly
may allow its holder, for example, to charge high fees or else restrict
entry into a market in order to reduce competition.
An example of rent-seeking would be the high fee for purchasing a
taxicab medallion and the resulting restraint of trade. Walter Williams,
who was once a taxi driver himself, has written on this phenomenon for
decades.
Perhaps the most egregious form of licensure involves New York
City taxicabs. The municipal government requires a medallion for
each operating cab. The code also provides for regulation of taxi
fares and other conditions of operation. The medallion system
stemmed from the Haas Act of 1937. Under the act, the city sold
medallions for $10 to all persons then operating taxis.63

Since that time, no new medallions have been issued except for 54
awarded for operating wheel-chair accessible vehicles. What has
happened in the three-quarters of a century since that date tells the rest of
the story. In 1947, the medallion price rose to $2,500. By 1960, it was
$28,000; 1970, $60,000; 1998, $200,000; and in May 2007, a taxi
medallion sold for $600,000. . . . In 2007, Medallion Finance Corporation
had $520,000,000 outstanding in taxi-medallion loans. As Williams
describes it, the bottom line is simple: ‘the value of the medallion shows
what the buyer is willing to pay for government protection from freemarket competition.’64 If a free market were introduced, the rent would
disappear and the market value of the medallions would plunge.
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Another illustration of rent-seeking may be found in the Book of Acts,
chapter 19, when Paul and his companions were caught up in a riot by a
guild of silversmiths who sought to have them thrown out of town for
hurting their idol business. But political institutions also provide
foundations for cooperative enterprises and the liberty that enables us to
pursue our vocations. Ancient Roman collegia and medieval guilds,
including roving bands of college students, were predecessors of craft
unions like the American Federation of Labor and modern universities.
Unfortunately, the distance between legitimate and illicit extractions –
taxes as opposed to mere brigandage – is often not very great. In The City
of God, St Augustine recounted the story of a pirate leader captured by
Alexander the Great: ‘When that king asked the man what he meant by
infesting the sea, he boldly replied: ‘What you mean by warring on the
whole world. I do my fighting on a tiny ship, and they call me a pirate;
you do yours with a large fleet, and they call you “Commander.”’65
Another and related concept is that of the free rider. A free rider is the
beneficiary of some collective good for which he does not pay the costs.
When this sort of benefit takes the form of a privilege it is a variation on
what Bastiat called legal plunder. What separated Alexander and the
pirate was a difference of scale – ‘wholesale’ rather than ‘retail’ – but not
of kind. Alexander may have considered the pirate a poacher, but both
had larceny in their hearts.
A black market presents a different case. New York has a large and
flourishing illicit and semi-legal gypsy-cab business that operates almost
side by side with the licensed cabs. Free markets often reassert
themselves when the expense and inconvenience of monopolies creates a
65
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demand for alternatives. This is a vast phenomenon that arises in all
sectors of the economy. In the area of education, for example, alternatives
to state schools run the gamut from charter schools to home schools. The
means of financing these options also varies widely.
In The Government Habit Redux, Jonathan R T Hughes sets forth his
major findings in a set of ten general propositions. Together they help us
recognize the magnitude and difficulty we face if we wish to bring public
spending back down to more manageable levels. The first proposition is
the key to understanding the rest:
1. Regulation creates economic rent. This is really a truism.
Regulation is interference with normal market outcomes. Someone
loses, someone gains. The gains are economic rents---returns in
excess of competitive returns. Resources flow to the highest returns
and therefore to the rents. The economy adjusts accordingly. It
becomes a different economy because of the rents—the regulation.66

What this means is that regulation is, by definition, something that
removes a portion of the economy from the free market sector. The
connection of the next proposition with Bastiat’s legal plunder, which is
logically connected to the first, should be even more evident:
2. The rents made available by regulation encourage free-riding by
stretching the rules or ignoring them. If most people are held in
check by regulation, it will pay, potentially, for individuals to
violate the regulations, getting a free ride at the expense of the
rest.67

But Hughes is perhaps being too generous here. New York’s system of
awarding taxi medallions might be regarded by an ordinary citizen as
66
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‘highway robbery.’ The result is the growth of an underground economy
that keeps a wide variety of transactions off the books. When this black
market becomes commonplace, government revenue sources dry up.
Unless taxes are raised, then governments are likely to turn to other tools
at their disposal, such as borrowing and inflation. Their costs of such
alternatives are even more difficult to calculate.
The remaining propositions should bring the story of Alexander and the
Gordian Knot to mind:
4. Rent-seeking is socially wasteful. … 5. It pays special-interest
coalitions to manipulate the power of the state to create rent. … 6.
Dominant groups will tend to use the state to redistribute wealth to
themselves. … 10. It pays those inside the government regulatory
establishment to push for expansion of regulation. The more
regulation, the greater the career opportunities for experienced
hands in the regulatory game.68

Thus through the wonders of genetic engineering we have created
something akin to Dr Dolittle’s pushmi-pullyu.
What began in the Progressive era as a desire for a living Constitution,
matured during the New Deal into the desire for a permanent
administrative state, and erupted in the 1960s as a continuing cultural
revolution in the name of a quest for social justice. This has led us to
Kurth’s sixth stage of the Protestant Deformation,

expressive

individualism, and a massive debt in the United States of more than $100
trillion in future obligations. Unfortunately, the dollar amount of our
mortgaged future may be the least part of the cost. Plunder may not be
systematic, as Bastiat feared, but it has taken on a life of its own, like an
old Roman-style corporation. Legal plunder has, as Bastiat expected,
68
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become ‘universal legal plunder.’69 Perhaps Mammon is the proper word
for it.
The New Testament uses the language of Roman law, however, to
describe a rather different corporation: the Church. Its leavening
influence continues to shape history after two millennia. Vishal
Mangalwadi concludes The Book That Made Your World with a
provocative observation:
Rome’s collapse meant that Europe lost its soul—the source of its
civilizational authority—and descended into the ‘Dark Ages.’ The
Bible was the power of revived Europe. Europeans became so
enthralled with God’s Word that they rejected their sacred myths to
hear God’ Word, study it, internalize it, speak it, and promote it to
build the modern world. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the
West is again losing its soul. Will it relapse into a new dark age or
humble itself before the Word of the Almighty God?70

IV

THE STATE OF DEPENDENCY: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND
PROPERTY

As we noted at the beginning of this essay, its subject, government
regulation, is contested terrain. It is a busy intersection in a bustling
center of commerce where law, economics, property rights, and ethics
converge and often conflict. It is a place where interests and boundaries
are often fluid and confused, where an honest surveyor or an impartial
judge may be difficult to find, where any determination of what is at
stake—costs and benefits, private as well as public—is part of what is in
dispute. Our best efforts to get the lay of the land are too easily derailed
or sidetracked as a result.
69
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During the Great Depression and before the outbreak of the Second
World War John Maynard Keynes wrote The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money (1936). The best known lesson that he
imparted was simply this:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any
intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years
back.71

This is why we seem so often to reach a dead end in our efforts. We hear
the wrong words and heed the wrong voices. As the Apostle Paul put it:
‘For now we see through a glass, darkly’ (1 Cor. 13:12 KJV). And so we
too often conclude that, since we live in the country of the blind, the oneeyed man is king. That must mean we should follow . . . Cyclops?
As J Budziszewski notes in The Revenge of Conscience: ‘the Tower of
Babel is a very ancient tale, and just as many voices, sects, and doctrines
quarreled in pre-modern times as today.’72 It is still incumbent upon us to
do ‘due diligence’ and engage in critical reasoning. The Apostle Paul
directs us along a better path: ‘Be diligent to present yourself approved to
God, a worker who does not need to be ashamed, rightly dividing the
word of truth’ (2 Tim. 2:15 NKJ). Even though the path we have been
following has the appearance of inevitability, we need to understand that
with this managerial revolution we are dealing with political strategies
71

John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money (Palgrave Macmillan, 1936) 383.
72
Budziszewski, above n 6, 7.

Vol 5

The Western Australian Jurist

113

and choices rather than eternal verities. Jonathan R T Hughes concludes
his 1992 book on a sobering note:
The problems for which the controls were invented are to be
managed in perpetuity, not solved. The ruling paradigm was
established by the first federal nonmarket control agency, the ICC.
We may well now have the controls because they reduce economic
efficiency; the controls are seen to save us from the uncertainties of
the free market just as civil government is seen to save us from the
uncertainties of anarchy. Professors of economics may not like the
parallel, but they do not make laws.73

Writing shortly after the introduction of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society
programs, America’s longshoreman philosopher, Eric Hoffer, made some
astute observations about the general practical-mindedness of Americans
that, in his judgment, made them largely immune to the appeals to
abstract ideas of social and economic justice by intellectual elites nestled
in academia, the media, and the bureaucracy. ‘Up to now,’ Hoffer wrote
in 1964:
America has not been a good milieu or the rise of a mass movement.
What starts out here as a mass movement ends up as a racket, a cult,
or a corporation. Unlike those anywhere else, the masses in America
have never despaired of the present and are not willing to sacrifice it
for a new life and a new world.74

But decades later, the economist Thomas Sowell remarked on a
transformation that by 1995 had already taken place. Having written
earlier about A Conflict of Visions at a time when the ‘constrained’ or
‘tragic vision’ still had articulate defenders, Sowell now intensified his
critique of the now prevailing ‘vision of the anointed’:
73
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What is seldom part of the vision of the anointed is a concept of
ordinary people as autonomous decision makers free to reject any
vision and to seek their own well-being through whatever social
processes they choose. Thus, when those with the prevailing vision
speak of the family—if only to defuse their adversaries’ emphasis
on family values—they tend to conceive of the family as a recipient
institution for government largess or guidance, rather than as a
decision-making institution determining for itself how children shall
be raised and with what values.75

Like Hughes, Sowell has been especially trenchant in analyzing the
enormous damage that a secular clerisy of do-gooders has inflicted upon
the civil body politic:
In order that this relatively small group of people can believe
themselves wiser and nobler than the common herd, we have
adopted policies which impose heavy costs on millions of other
human beings, not only in taxes but also in lost jobs, social
disintegration, and a loss of personal safety. Seldom have so few
cost so much to so many.76

Let us turn to Sowell’s friend Walter Williams who has time and again
proven himself willing to ‘speak truth to power.’ Williams, who wrote a
powerful memoir entitled Up from the Projects (2010),77 more recently
released another book: Race and Economics. In the preface he writes:
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As a generality, if one is a member of a minority, he is less likely to
realize his preferences if decisions are made in the political arena,
particularly if they are made at the national level.78

In these words we may sense the quality of thought that Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay instilled into the Federalist Papers. The excerpt that
follows could serve, along with some of our readings this term, as a
manifesto for a renewed constitutionalism:
Consider another comparison between market- and politicalresource allocation. If one tours a low-income black neighborhood,
he will see people wearing some nice clothing, eating some nice
food, driving some nice cars, and he might even see some nice
houses—but no nice schools. Why? The answer relates directly to
how clothing, food, cars, and houses—versus schools—are
allocated. Clothing, food, cars, and houses are allocated through the
market mechanism. Schools, for the most part, are parceled out
through the political mechanism. If a buyer is dissatisfied with
goods distributed in the market, the individual can simply ‘fire’ the
producer by taking his business elsewhere. If a buyer (taxpayer) is
dissatisfied with a public school, such an option is not, in a black
neighborhood, economically viable to him. He has to bear the
burden of moving to a neighborhood with better schools.79

George Stigler made a similar point when he wrote:
Until the basic logic of political life is developed, reformers will be
ill-equipped to use the state for their reforms, and victims of the
pervasive use of the state’s support of special groups will be
helpless to protect themselves.80
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It is a vicious circle that, once again, locks everyone into preordained
failure, into the proverbial race for the bottom. An old Soviet-era saying
applies here: ‘We pretend to work, they pretend to pay us.’ Our own
variation on this theme is: ‘We have got the best tunnel vision money can
buy.’ Instead, we need to stop looking at our feet and start inspecting the
road ahead.
Government regulation is the old problem of monopoly all over again—
for which antitrust laws and regulations were intended to be the solution.
But instead of just private corporations vested by the state with such
special privileges as limited liability, these overweening monopoly
powers are now also vested in agencies of the government itself. When
tax burdens and other problems mount, residents of various cities, states,
and countries tend to ‘vote with their feet’ and take their time, talents, and
treasure elsewhere. As a result, many countries, states, and communities
must contend with a shrinking tax base.81
The late Roman Empire faced a similar problem and ‘solved’ it by
making office-holding hereditary and continued service in office
mandatory. Still, this did not stop a great many Roman families from
exiting the empire before it crumbled. To rephrase an old line: A lot of
good people came from Rome, and the better they were, the faster they
came. The question we face today is: How can we keep our own
entrepreneurs down home when we have made emigration such an
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attractive option? How do we get our economy and our political priorities
back into fighting trim?
Resistance may take many forms and those forms are most effective that
can convey their lessons with a smile. An entertaining piece that supports
this concluding section is a rap video entitled ‘Keynes vs. Hayek, the
Second Round.’ Along with its predecessor, which may also be found on
the web, it should remind us of something else the Apostle wrote: ‘For
we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against
powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual
wickedness in high places’ (Eph. 6:12). Lord Keynes was correct in
discerning some of the economic consequences of the Peace of Versailles
and, later, some of the problems with unemployment during the Great
Depression. But the video should remind us that the acclaim that the
Keyneses of their day show how difficult it is to defend against what Erik
von Kuehnelt-Leddihn called ‘clear but false ideas.’ We need to keep our
eye on the ball at all times and learn not to be distracted by the crowd.
Perhaps there are a few things the frenzies of academic scribblers can
teach us. Let us now end where we should wish to have started and then
work our way toward a conclusion. The Keynes vs Hayek rap video
linked in the footnote has some great lines and even some wisdom to
impart for those who are prepared probe more deeply. Western
civilization has been deeply cleft by the old dilemma of the One and the
Many, the age-old battle of the universals. Consider these lines about the
economy the video assigns to Keynes:
It’s just like an engine that’s stalled and gone dark. To bring it to
life we need a quick spark. Spending’s the life blood that gets the
flow going. Where it goes doesn’t matter. Just Get Spending
Flowing.
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The positivists and other reductionists who steer the ship of state say we
human beings are nothing but sophisticated machines. Jeremy Bentham
could scarcely have made the point plainer. But Hayek’s reply cuts to the
heart of the matter:
The economy’s not a car. There’s no engine to stall. No expert can
fix it. There’s no ‘it’ at all. The economy is us. We don’t need a
mechanic. Put away the wrenches. The economy is organic.82

Meeting the challenges of the day requires cultivation of clear-sighted
public philosophy. Adam Smith’s invisible hand, Bastiat’s ‘unseen,’
Michael Polanyi’s tacit dimension, Hayek’s spontaneous order, the
doctrines of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty—these are ideas that we
ignore at our peril. Indeed, ‘ideas have consequences,’ as Richard Weaver
put it in the title of an American classic. We may not understand how
these notions work, but, as Shakespeare put it in another context in
Hamlet: ‘There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are
dreamt of in your philosophy.’ By the way, Shakespeare’s valedictory
meditation on his career and the arc of his life in The Tempest repays an
occasional rereading for those who wish to better understand the
trajectory of their own lives.
In diversity there is strength where trust and community prevail, where
we are open to a free exchange of ideas and where we commit ourselves
to a constitutionally limited government. Using the state to impose a
‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to every problem is a breach of trust and a
recipe for strife. Legal plunder has a chilling effect by making us
82
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complicit in pulling the rug from under other people’s feet and violating
our own consciences. Americans still have a First Amendment that is not
yet encased in glass – to be broken only in an emergency. To be a citizen
means being a sentinel against all that threatens our lives, liberties, and
property. The founders never intended that ‘We the People’ be replaced
by a more compliant army of invertebrates.
So let us conclude our examination of the political economy of law,
property, and regulation by returning to Kenneth Minogue’s Politics: A
Very Short Introduction, which is a meditation on the tension within the
state between politics, the art of persuasion, and despotism, the
technology of coercion. Despotism takes many forms and often comes
presented in the tempting coloration of a counterculture. In our times it
comes in the guise of what Minogue calls political moralism, which may
begin as false philanthropy but, once it rules, tends to exhibit some
degree of what Polanyi calls moral inversion and Roger Scruton calls the
culture of repudiation.
Reaching back analytically to the period following the French
Revolution, Minogue observes:
In the course of the nineteenth century … as the suffrage broadened,
welfare came to be as interesting to rulers as war had always been.
Foreign enemies, on the one hand, and the poor on the other, were
interesting politically because they constituted a reason for
exercising dazzling powers of government and administration. The
poor became so interesting, in fact, that they could not be allowed to
fade away, and whole new definitions of poverty, as relative to
rising levels of average income, were constructed in order not only
to keep the poor in being but actually to increase their numbers.
Simultaneously, new classes of supposedly oppressed members of

120

Samson, Government Regulation, Part II

2014

contemporary society began to use poverty leverage to extract
benefits in redistributive states.
This is how the state in the twentieth century discovered
dependence, which had previously occupied no more than a small
patch in the sphere of morality. One moral virtue, charity, in a
politicized form, expanded to take over politics.83

This is the power of legal plunder. It converts a sweet land of liberty into
a perpetual squabble between tax drudges and free riders who are so
blended together that it is difficult to tell the difference.
Yes, some kind of tutelary power has its place in the larger scheme of
things but as the Apostle Paul also put it: ‘Now I say that the heir, as long
as he is a child, does not differ at all from a slave, though he is master of
all, but is under guardians and stewards until the time appointed by the
father’ (Gal. 4:1-2). We are all always under authority but, politically, we
are not made for a state of perpetual dependency. In fact, a ‘politics’ of
dependency is a contradiction in terms. Once you leave the political
realm of independence you enter that of despotism and submission.
As the Apostle indicates, there is a time appointed ‘by the Father’ to take
our place at the table. Let us choose to be self-governing, to be politically
mature, to freely and conscientiously take our stand. Indeed, we have
nothing to lose but our chains. We may choose, as Jesus depicted in a
parable, to become fellow-laborers in the vineyard of the Lord (Matt.
20:1-16).
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The concluding paragraph to Kenneth Minogue’s little book on politics is
a fitting way to wrap up this meditation on the political economy of
regulation:
This introduction ends, then, with an example of political theory, an
argument likely to provoke disagreement, perhaps even a bit of
outrage. And if it does do that, it will have succeeded in illustrating
one more aspect of the many-sided thing we have been studying.
Farewell.84
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